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Summary 
Environmental policies are discussed when two countries differ in their ability to abate 
pollution. Northern eco-industries (the industry supplying abatement activities) are more 
efficient than Southern ones. Segmented environmental markets and a Northern 
monopoly yield identical second-best taxes in both countries. When markets are global, 
Southern countries underestimate the market power of eco-industries. Introducing 
competition creates positive (resp. negative) rent-shifting distortions in South (resp. 
North). Cooperation could reduce Northern pollution but has ambiguous consequences 
in South. 
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One cannot deny huge di®erences in the stringency of environmental policies around the world.
There are very good economic explanations to this phenomenon. First, the social value of
environmental damage di®ers among countries, even if the level of pollution is the same. In fact,
the environmental damage depends on the citizens' perception of pollution, and it is positively
correlated with income. Strategic incentives are also responsible for di®erences in environmental
policies, even when one tackles the same issue. An environmental policy can re°ect the relative
power of di®erent lobby groups.
To all these very good explanations, we intend in this paper to add another one. The line of
argument is straightforward: setting up an environmental policy creates a demand for abatement
activities. This demand can be supplied by the own resources of a polluting ¯rm. However, there
is a point where it is more e±cient for a ¯rm to outsource these activities to an eco-industry
sector.1 Water and waste-water management represents 40% of the activity of this sector, waste
management 28% and air pollution control 20% (OECD 1996). On the supply side, the main
characteristic concerns the high level of concentration. On each sub-sector, three or four ¯rms
often represent more than 80% of the overall turnover. Furthermore, the environmental market
size depends on the stringency of environmental policies and these policies appeared sooner
and stronger in developed countries, due to an early rise in environmental awareness. It has
allowed the emergence of European and North-American ¯rms (Barton 1997). Today, 90% of
eco-industry ¯rms come from OECD countries (Kennett & Steenblik 2005).
Meanwhile, a new process has started in less developed countries in order to catch up with
European and North-american environmental standards. For instance, new Member States of
the European Union need to ful¯ll an important \acquis communautaire". The environmental
standards of the E.U. create considerable needs for those countries. It is likely that they will be
supplied by Western European ¯rms. Whether this could act as a brake on the stringency of
environmental policies is the ¯rst wonder of this article. In other words, when eco-industry ¯rms
are foreign-owned, is there an incentive to deviate from the optimal tax rate that would have
been chosen in a closed economy? In fact, more stringent environmental policies induce a higher
demand in abatement activities and possibly a shift in rents toward foreign ¯rms. It is shown
that it is indeed in the interest of developing countries to lower their pollution tax rate when
eco-industries are foreign-owned. For instance, when markets are segmented (environmental
prices di®er according to the country) and all eco-industry ¯rms have Northern assets, the
Southern tax rate will fall short of marginal damage, even though restrictions in production in
the environment market usually tend to push the regulator to choose a tax above the marginal
1\Eco-industries may be described as including ¯rms producing goods and services capable of measuring,
preventing, limiting or correcting environmental damage such as the pollution of water, air, soil, as well as waste
and noise-related problems. They include clean-technologies where pollution and raw-material used is being
minimized" (OECD 1999)
2damage.2 When a local eco-industry is introduced, rent-shifting e®ects tend to push up the
tax in the South and our results become more ambiguous. The di®erence in optimal tax rates
between both countries is then based on current eco-industry's market shares and the way they
are in°uenced by a change in the tax.
It has already been discussed that the eco-industry sector is highly concentrated. Firms of this
sector increase their prices above marginal costs, which modi¯es policy recommendations (David
& Sinclair-Desgagn¶ e 2005). The authors consider an oligopolistic Cournot competition between
eco-industry ¯rms and evaluates the consequences on di®erent environmental policy instruments
(taxes, quotas, voluntary approaches, :::). In particular, the authors show that tax rates should
be chosen above marginal damage in order to compensate the lower level of abatement that higher
prices induce. Two other papers build on the previous analysis by adding imperfect competition
among polluting ¯rms (Nimubona & Sinclair-Desgagn¶ e 2005, Canton et al. 2005). Both papers
remain focused on pollution taxes. They show that an optimal tax rate is the result of a trade-
o® between two opposite incentives: lowering the tax in order to compensate the low level of
production of polluting ¯rms or increasing it so as to avoid a sub-optimal level of abatement.
In the present paper, we extend the framework of David & Sinclair-Desgagn¶ e (2005) in an
international context, focusing on environmental tax rates only. As eco-industry ¯rms come from
di®erent countries, regulators tend to internalize the externality but also to shift rents toward
local ¯rms. Regulators behaving so as to shift rents refers to the traditional analysis of strategic
trade policies (Brander & Spencer 1985) and even more to strategic environmental policies when
trade instruments are not available (Barrett 1994, Ulph 1996). In this literature, it is shown that
it can be in the interest of a regulator maximizing local welfare to use environmental policies
so as to give a competitive advantage to local polluting ¯rms. Most of the time, this gives
rise to lower levels of taxation than what would have happened without strategic incentives.
Compared to the previous literature, the regulator behaves in our context so as to shift rents
at an upstream level. The implications of imperfect competition in intermediate goods supply
on strategic trade policy have ¯rst been examined by Ishikawa & Spencer (1999). They show
that a subsidy aimed at shifting rents from foreign to domestic ¯nal-good producers is lowered
by the presence of foreign intermediate-good producers.
Environmental taxation in the presence of an international eco-industry mixes both strands
of literature. First, Fees & Muehlheusser (2002) consider two polluting ¯rms competing µ a la
Cournot on a third market, and buying environmental goods to an eco-industry, based in North,
supplying both markets and characterized by a learning-by-doing cost function. Environmen-
tal policies are set up in two countries on two periods. The authors show that North tends
to increase the environmental policy in the ¯rst period in order to bene¯t from economies of
scale in the second period. Building on this framework, Greaker (2006) adds the possibility of
2In this work, the terminology \North" and \South" is used so as to di®erentiate countries according to the
e±ciency of their eco-industries.
3foreign competition (both on local and international markets) and endogenizes the price of envi-
ronmental inputs. The author shows that a strong environmental policy may bene¯t industrial
competitiveness through its e®ect on the price of pollution abatement. However, the author
only studies emission quotas and maintains imperfect competition among polluting ¯rms. We
have chosen to focus on the environmental market and on taxation. Therefore, the analysis
is simpli¯ed by assuming perfect competition among polluting ¯rms. It allows us to present
di®erent environmental market structures and to test the robustness of our results to various
assumptions. Another way to model the abatement services market would have been to follow
Copeland (2005) and model this market with monopolistic competition. The author notably
shows that optimal pollution taxes for a uniformly mixed pollutant such as carbon emissions
may not be uniform across sectors. However, we are more interested in the way pro¯ts shift
from one country to another.
We ¯rst present the simplest case: two countries without any interactions. In each country,
a regulator endogenizes the externality of a polluting industry by setting up an environmental
tax. Thus, polluting ¯rms have an incentive to purchase environmental goods and services.
Abatement activities are supplied by a monopoly. This monopoly belongs to Northern consumers
and is made up by two autonomous centers of decisions, one based in North, the other one based
in South. These centers are assumed autonomous for two reasons. First, markets are segmented
so prices di®er across countries.3
Second, average production costs are assumed constant, so there are no economies of scale. As
the monopoly returns pro¯ts to its Northern shareholders, which makes welfare lower in South,
it is shown that the optimal environmental tax rate is lower in South than it is in North. This
di®erence is increased in the presence of a single world market because the Southern regulator
underestimates the overall mark-up that a Northern eco-industry ¯rm makes. The consequence
is an even lower tax rate in South than in North. Afterward, an eco-industry with Southern
shareholders enters the market. First, environmental markets are supposed segmented. Thus,
in each country a domestic and a foreign ¯rm compete via two decision centers, the Southern
¯rm having higher production costs. In this context, the asymmetric Cournot-Nash competition
induces rent-shifting e®ects that lead to lower tax rates in the North than before competition
takes place. The di®erence between both countries' environmental taxation depends on environ-
ment ¯rms' market shares. Furthermore, if the di®erence in production costs is high enough, the
Southern regulator can even choose a higher tax than in the monopoly case. Rent-shifting in-
centives overcompensate the bene¯ts of increased competition. Second, we study a model of tax
competition when the environmental market is international. This situation, that can be seen as
3There are many good reasons to assume that eco-¯rms locate in the country rather than exporting. First,
these markets depend on local regulation, that can di®er greatly from one country to another. Second, they also
depend on local technical characteristics, such as the geography of a region. Therefore, it is one of the main issues
that entrepreneurs from the sector raised when asked by governments (Numeri & R.D.I. 2004).
4a consequence of trade liberalization in the environmental goods and services market, has am-
biguous e®ects on environmental taxation in both countries. Introducing cooperative behaviors
(as in Greaker (2003)) does not necessarily allow to increase the environmental performance.
The rest of the document proceeds as follows. Section 2 considers the monopoly case. Section
3 examines environmental taxation when markets are segmented and two asymmetric ¯rms
compete in each country. Section 4 introduces a world market of environmental goods and
services and studies the robustness of the previous results whether countries cooperate or not.
Section 5 sums up our work.
2 Environmental taxation when the eco-industry is a monopoly
In this section, a second-best environmental taxation is chosen by two regulators, each one
facing a polluting industry purchasing abatement technologies to a monopolistic eco-industry.
The eco-industry ¯rm is assumed to belong to Northern shareholders and discriminates among
countries via two plants (or decision centers), one based in each country. Everything else being
identical, we can focus on the speci¯c consequences of the ownership pattern of an eco-industry
on environmental taxation. First, both environmental markets are segmented, so there is no
interaction. Second, we allow for an international market and show that market segmentation
is a crucial assumption of the model.
This is a three stage game. In the ¯rst stage, the regulator chooses the tax so as to maximize
its country's welfare. Welfare depends on consumers' surplus, on ¯rms' pro¯ts and on the
environmental damage. In a second stage, the environmental industry determines the level
of production and the price of environmental goods, anticipating downstream demand. In a
third stage, polluting ¯rms compete so as to maximize their pro¯ts. They are assumed to be
price-takers in the ¯nal good market. As usual, this game is solved by backward induction.
2.1 Optimal decision by polluting ¯rms
Polluting ¯rms maximize their pro¯ts, given prices of ¯nal and environmental goods. They also
consider as given the pollution tax chosen by the regulator. We assume that in each country,
there exists a continuum of ¯rms, included between 0 and 1. Thus, a single ¯rm can represent
the overall market. So, in country j = s;n, its pro¯t function can be written as follows:
¦j(xj;aj) = Pjxj ¡ c(xj) ¡ pjaj ¡ tj(²(xj) ¡ w(aj)) (1)
where in each country, Pj is the ¯nal good market price,4 c(xj) is an increasing and convex
cost function, pj the price of environmental goods, aj the quantities purchased of environmental
4P(xj) is the inverse demand function and determines the market price equilibrium.
5goods and ²(xj)¡w(aj) the net emission function. We consider an end-of-pipe pollution, where
²(xj) measures the link between production and polluted waste (²0(xj) > 0, ²00(xj) ¸ 0) and
w(aj) expresses the abatement activities due to the purchase of aj environmental goods. This
function tends to re°ect the growing di±culty in cleaning up polluted waste, i.e. the marginal
e±ciency of abatement activities is decreasing in aj (w0(aj) > 0 but w00(aj) < 0). Each polluting
¯rm maximizes its pro¯ts considering two variables, xj and aj. As production and pollution are
additively separable, we ¯rst investigate the optimal level of production.
2.1.1 Production in ¯nal goods
First order conditions of pro¯t maximization are, 8 j = s;n.
@¦j
@xj
= Pj ¡ c0(xj) ¡ tj²0(xj) = 0 (2)




= ¡c00(xj) ¡ tj²00(xj) < 0 (3)
First order conditions yield the optimal inverse supply function of polluting goods. At the
market price equilibrium, supply equals demand (P(x¤
j) = c0(x¤
j) + tj²0(x¤
j)). We assume that
x¤
j(tj) exists and is unique.
2.1.2 Demand in environmental goods
Each polluting ¯rm chooses the optimal level of environmental goods purchased, according to
the tax and the price of environmental inputs. Thus, ¯rst and second order conditions are,
8 j = s;n:
@¦j
@aj




= tjw00(aj) < 0 (5)
Assuming an interior solution will be chosen, i.e.
pj
tj 2]0;limaj!0 w0(aj)[, the downstream de-
mand in environmental goods is given by aj = w0¡1(
pj
tj ).
2.2 The eco-industry's decision
The eco-industry ¯rm l5 acts, via its two decision centers, as a monopoly in each local market.
It anticipates the demand of downstream ¯rms and chooses the optimal supply and the price
5As opposed to h for the Southern ¯rm in the next section
6equilibrium in environmental goods. Therefore, 8 j = s;n, its pro¯t function ¦
up







aj ¡ cl(aj) (6)
where tjw0(aj) = pj(aj) is the inverse demand function in environmental goods, aj is the pro-
duction of environmental goods in country j, and cl(aj) the cost function of the eco-industry,









aj + tjw0(aj) ¡ c0






= 2tjw00(aj) + tjw000(aj)aj ¡ c00
l (aj) < 0 (8)
Equalizing supply and demand yields a¤
j(tj), the optimal level of environmental goods produced,
according to the country's level of taxation. As the standard analysis of monopolies tells us, the
price is ¯xed above marginal cost.
2.3 Welfare and optimal tax rates
Both welfare functions take account of the pro¯ts of polluting ¯rms and consider the environ-
mental damage. The only di®erence comes from the fact that in North, the regulator considers
pro¯ts of the eco-industry6 whereas in South, buying environmental goods and services only
































where º is the marginal environmental damage, assumed constant. Totally di®erentiating these
functions with respect to the tax rate gives the ¯rst order condition of welfare maximization.7
2.3.1 The regulator's decision in North
The welfare maximization condition in North is:
6As markets are segmented, pro¯ts made in South by the eco-industry are not in°uenced by the Northern
regulator's decision. Therefore, they only appear as a constant in the Northern welfare function.
7In order to simplify the expressions, we drop the superscript
¤ and the fact that optimal values of production
depend on tj. However, each time a regulator takes its decision, one must recall that it is given the equilibrium


































which yields, recalling that tnw00(an) = p0
n(an)









Before giving a few comments, let us present the sense of direction of production and depollu-
tion according to variations in the tax rate. By totally di®erentiating ¯rst order conditions of
polluting and environmental ¯rms, and recalling that supply must equal demand in the ¯nal











tjw000(aj)aj + 2tjw00(aj) ¡ c00
l (aj)
> 0 (15)
So, as the denominator and numerator of the second term on the RHS of Equation 13 are always
negative, a second best solution leads to t¤
n > º. We ¯nd again the results already presented by
David & Sinclair-Desgagn¶ e (2005). There exists an incentive for the regulator to increase the
tax above marginal damage so as to reach an optimal trade-o® between abatement activities
and downstream production levels.
2.3.2 The decision in South































@ts = w0(as) is the direct impact of a change in the tax on the demand in environmental
goods and services. Rewriting this condition using Equation 2, 4 and 7 yields:











In addition to the marginal environmental damage, the Southern regulator considers two other
terms in order to set up its optimal environmental taxation. First, we ¯nd again the distortion
presented in the Northern case. There is an incentive to increase the tax above the marginal
damage so as to push polluting ¯rms to increase their abatement activities. This impact is
identical in both countries because when the eco-industry monopoly maximizes its pro¯ts, it
chooses a level of production such as marginal bene¯t equals marginal cost. In the welfare
maximization condition, what matters in North is the marginal cost of the eco-industry whereas
in South, it is the marginal bene¯t. Second, a speci¯c element appears in the case of a country
purchasing abatement activities from a foreign ¯rm. When the tax increases, demand is switched
upward, and it increases the rents given to the foreign monopoly. This e®ect gives incentives to
the regulator to lower the environmental tax. Because the equilibrium price of environmental
goods and services always increases following an increase in the tax, we are sure that the second
e®ect dominates the ¯rst one. The following proposition summarizes this position:
Proposition 1 (i) The presence of a foreign monopoly selling environmental goods and services
adds a negative incentive in the choice of the optimal tax for the Southern regulator. (ii) The
optimal pollution tax then falls short of marginal damage.










dts is the overall
price variation following an increase in the tax. We have already mentioned that an increase
in the tax switched upward the demand and always increases the quantity of environmental
goods consumed. By considering the pro¯t maximization condition of the monopoly, it has a
non-ambiguous positive impact on the price of abatement goods. ¤
It is almost immediate to see that previous results hold if the monopoly is partially owned by
domestic investors or if Northern eco-industry's pro¯ts are taxed in South. The result remains
also true if there is competition among eco-industry ¯rms under the condition that they all come
from the same country. Let us now focus on international environmental markets.
2.4 Global market and environmental policies
We keep the same framework except that polluting ¯rms can now buy environmental goods
in both countries, without any further costs. Therefore, the price p of environmental goods
is unique across countries, the result of the confrontation of global demand and global supply.
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Compared to the previous analysis, regulators consider the in°uence of a change in their policy
on foreign demand and therefore on the new price equilibrium. Rewriting previous conditions
yields:










tn = º +






where A = as + an. Compared to the segmented markets case, the Southern regulator has
another incentive to lower its tax. In fact, in order to choose the optimal level of distortion,
the Southern regulator only considers its country's demand (as) whereas the Northern regulator
considers the world production (A). In other words, the second-best trade-o® of the Southern
regulator leads to a lower level of abatement than the one chosen by the country holding the
eco-industry for two di®erent reasons. In that country, the regulator considers the pro¯t function
of the eco-industry, and therefore its overall production. Rents are also positive for this country,
so the tax can be chosen above the marginal cost of pollution.
In terms of policy recommendations, when abatement activities are supplied by a monopoly,
the environmental performance would be increased by decisions taken at a global level. Coop-
eration is useful, not because of a risk of tax competition but because some countries do not
consider the overall supply of environmental goods and therefore do not endogenize the true
mark-up that imperfect competition may create in the eco-industry market. Kirkspatrick et al.
(2006) discuss some of the reasons that could explain that so little progress has been made
in the trade liberalization in environmental services. Among them, they recall that Southern
countries are quite reluctant to ask foreign ¯rms to supply their local markets, especially when
it has to do with such a sensitive sector as the water and sanitation one. From our analysis,
one can understand that indeed, it would be in the interest of a Southern regulator to reduce
10its environmental taxation when subject to a world price of environmental goods and services
and foreign ¯rms only.
3 Pollution tax and asymmetric Cournot duopolies
In the previous section, when all eco-industry ¯rms come from the same country, environmental
taxation is less stringent in the country that does not hold the eco-industry ¯rm. Here, we study
the consequences of competition among ¯rms coming from di®erent countries. A Southern ¯rm,
with higher production costs, enters the market. The asymmetric competition among foreign
and local eco-industries justi¯es di®erences in environmental policies. However, the reasons di®er
from the previous section. Strategic rent-shifting e®ects appear as the main incentive to distort
pollution taxes.
3.1 Asymmetric Cournot competition in the environmental market
We assume that a Cournot-Nash strategic game takes place in the environmental sector between
two asymmetric ¯rms. Each ¯rm has two decision centers, one in each country. Downstream,
the last stage of the game is not modi¯ed. Polluting ¯rms maximize their pro¯ts, which yields
the overall inverse downstream demand in environmental goods in each country.
In the environmental market, each ¯rm's decision center, in each country, maximizes its pro¯t
function, taking as given the production of the other decision center based in the country. So,
8 j = s;n
¦
up
hj(ahj;alj) = pj(aj)ahj ¡ ch(ahj) (22)
¦
up
lj (al;ah) = pj(aj)alj ¡ cl(alj) (23)
where for each country j, pj(aj) is the overall inverse demand in environmental goods, ahj the
production of the Southern eco-industry, alj the production of the Northern eco-industry and
cl(alj) and ch(ahj) their respective cost functions. They are assumed linear and we suppose
cl < ch whatever the country. The di®erence in marginal production costs re°ects the advantage
of early movers that Norther ¯rms hold. As environmental policies appeared sooner in developed
countries, these eco-industry ¯rms have been able to commit themselves to strategic capacities
in a ¯rst stage of a strategic game. Consequently, we are facing the second stage of this game,
when ¯rms compete in quantities. According to Tirole (1995), this argument is of the same line
that the one presented in Dixit (1980). Another explanation could be found in the fact that
knowledge-based assets, as de¯ned by Markusen (1995), remain in possession of the Northern
multinational ¯rm even when the plant is based in South, giving a competitive advantage to the
Northern ¯rm in both countries.
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(alj;ahj) = pj(aj) + p0
j(aj)alj ¡ cl = 0 (25)































Assumption 1 means that reaction functions are downward sloping and Assumption 2 ensures the
stability condition is satis¯ed. We are sure that there exists a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium
(a¤
hj;a¤
lj). The market share of the low-cost ¯rm is always higher than the high-cost ¯rm's one.
However, when tax rates vary, the sense of direction of market shares, given by comparative
statics, is ambiguous. First, we can sum FOCs across the two ¯rms: 8 j = s;n,
2pj(aj) + p0
j(aj)aj = ch + cl (26)
As the market price of environmental goods is equal to tjw0(aj), this equation can be rewritten
by dividing both sides by tj:



















j (3w00(aj) + ajw000(aj))
(29)
Given the assumptions made in order to ensure the existence and uniqueness of a solution, the
denominator is always negative.
Lemma 1 Whatever the country, pollution tax rates and overall environmental production vary
in the same direction.
As recalled by Long & Soubeyran (2001), the equilibrium industry output is uniquely deter-
mined by the sum of marginal production costs. Furthermore, it is negatively correlated to
12this sum. Increasing a tax is equivalent to reducing the overall marginal production costs of
the environmental industry. It gives an intuition to the positive correlation between tax and
environmental production.
Within this framework, we specify the production patterns for both ¯rms. Dividing both
¯rst order conditions by the tax rate and totally di®erentiating the equations yields, 8 i = h;l,
8 j = s;n:


















This expression can either be positive or negative. For instance, when the marginal e±ciency
of marginal depollution is constant (w00(aj) = cst, i.e. p00
j(aj) = 0), sign(
dalj
dtj ) = sign(2cl ¡ ch).
In other words, in this context, if the low-cost ¯rm is much more e±cient than the high-cost one
(2cl¡ch < 0),8 an increase in the tax leads to a decrease in the low-cost ¯rm's production.9 In a
more general context, it all depends on the sign of the term ® = w00(aj)(2cl¡ch)+w000(aj)(clahj¡
chalj).
Lemma 2 If ® is negative (resp. positive), the production of the low-cost ¯rm increases (resp.
decreases) in the tax rate. When the marginal depollution is constant, a high di®erence in
marginal production costs yields ® < 0.




















is negative (resp. positive), the production
of the less e±cient ¯rm decreases (resp. increases) in tj. When Assumption 1 holds, this term
is always negative.10
8The low-cost ¯rm enters the market as soon as tj > 2cl ¡ ch and the high cost ¯rm when tj > 2ch ¡ cl.
Therefore, the case discussed can be encountered when both ¯rms have a strictly positive level of production.
9This condition is similar to the one presented in Carraro & Soubeyran (1996), where a polluting ¯rm would
bene¯t from an environmental policy if another ¯rm pollutes twice as much per unit of output.
10In Simpson (1995), a pollution tax induced transfers from the low-e±cient polluting ¯rm to the high-e±cient
polluting ¯rm. As in our case, the tax induces transfers in the opposite directions, further work should precise
what are the true welfare consequences of an increase in the pollution tax.
13Lemma 3 Whatever the country, an increase in the tax rate always increases the production of
the high-cost ¯rm.
Lemma 4 As ¯ is always higher than ®, an increase (resp. a decrease) in the environmental
tax rate leads to an increase (resp. a decrease) in the market share of the high-cost ¯rm and a
decrease (resp. an increase) in the market share of the low-cost ¯rm.
Appendix 6.1 presents what would be the price and consumption of environmental goods and
services according to the tax rates when using speci¯c functions.
3.2 Regulators' decisions
Regulators are concerned by the variations in ¯rms' market shares. It appears in the ¯rst order
condition of welfare maximization.
3.2.1 Domestic competition in South
Compared to the previous section, the welfare function must take account of the pro¯t of the




P(u)du ¡ c(xs) ¡ ps(as)as + ps(as)ahs ¡ ch(ahs) ¡ º (²(xs) ¡ w(as)) (33)
where as is the overall demand in environmental goods in South, ahs the demand satis¯ed by






































Using the conditions on the ¯rms' pro¯t maximization leads to:














Compared to the monopoly's analysis, not only do variations in overall demand matter but also
variations in the production of one speci¯c ¯rm, the foreign one.11 In other words, the tax re-
mains positively distorted so as to increase incentives in abatement activities, but this distortion
11In South, the foreign ¯rm is the low-cost one.
14could be strengthened or lowered according to variations in the foreign ¯rm's production. In
general, this e®ect will push toward a lower tax rate, as an increase in the tax leads to more
production for the foreign ¯rm. However, recalling Lemma 2, in some cases, low-cost ¯rms'
outputs decrease. In addition to regulating the environmental damage, it is possible to reduce
the in°uence of foreign ¯rms in the country. A kind of double dividend argument appears in
favor of more stringent environmental policies. Finally, the rent e®ect is now only based on the
initial production pattern of the foreign ¯rm. Rents are only negative for the regulator if they
are given to the foreign ¯rm, which reduces the incentives toward a lower environmental tax,
compared to the monopoly case.
Proposition 2 (i) When both ¯rms increase their production pattern in the tax rate, the South-
ern regulator chooses a tax lower than what would have been necessary if both ¯rms had been
from the same country. (ii) When the production of the foreign ¯rm decreases in the tax, there
is an incentive for the regulator to over-tax, in order to shift more rents toward national ¯rms.
Proof: (i) If both ¯rms came from the same country, only the ¯rst distortion would remain.
When dals
dts > 0, the two other terms in Equation 35 are positive, leading to a lower tax than in
the case of local competition only. (ii) Comparing Equations 17 and 35, two di®erences appear.
First, the rent e®ect term is lower, as the Southern regulator now only considers the foreign




dts . When this term is negative, i.e. when dal
dts < 0, it tends to give more incentives
to increase the tax. ¤
In a sense, this model is similar to the one of Simpson (1995). The author studies the possi-
bility for some asymmetric polluting ¯rms competing µ a la Cournot to increase their production
when they are subject to more stringent environmental taxation. We use the same argument,
but about competition at an upstream level, when environmental taxation increases demand
and can bene¯t the less e±cient ¯rms.
3.2.2 Foreign competition in North
We now introduce competition in North, where a less e±cient ¯rm than the domestic one enters




P(u)du ¡ c(xn) ¡ pn(an)an + pn(an)aln ¡ cl(aln) ¡ º (²(xn) ¡ w(an)) (36)
The ¯rst order condition of welfare maximization yields:














15As the production of the less e±cient ¯rm is positively correlated with the tax rate, the last
two terms of the numerator are positive, which tends to lower the tax compared to the situation
where both ¯rms were domestic. In other words, when the market size is large enough for
two ¯rms to enter, the regulator lowers its environmental standards to reduce the rent-shifting
toward foreign ¯rms.
By comparing the distortions induced by foreign competition in both countries, we ¯nd that
the tax in North can be lower or higher than the tax in South, depending on the relative




dts , which means that
market shares are shifted toward the high-cost ¯rm in both countries when the tax rate is




@ts als, which means that market shares
remain higher than one half for the most e±cient ¯rm.
Proposition 3 (i) In the presence of a foreign eco-industry ¯rm, the Northern optimal tax is
lower than in the case of local competition only (ii) The di®erence between the Northern tax and
the Southern one is ambiguous, and depends on the relative in°uence of the initial market shares
and their variations following an increase in the tax
The choice of an optimal tax is the result of a trade-o® between the fact that polluting ¯rms
do not abate enough and the fact that part of the environmental market is supplied by a foreign
¯rm, sending pro¯ts abroad. When the latter e®ect dominates the former, which for instance
happens when the production of the low-cost ¯rm decreases following an increase in the tax,
the optimal Northern tax rate can even fall short of marginal damage, even though polluting
¯rms are perfectly competitive. The following section is devoted to check the robustness of these
results when the environmental market is open to international trade.
4 Tax competition
In this section, we consider eco-industry ¯rms when they cannot discriminate between countries.
There exists a unique world price of environmental goods and services. Two eco-industry ¯rms,
one based in each country, compete so as to supply the overall demand from polluting ¯rms.
There is no transport costs or tari®s so that polluting ¯rms buy indi®erently to foreign or
domestic ¯rms. Countries are symmetric apart from the production costs of eco-industries.
Countries' decisions are now interrelated. Both non-cooperative and cooperative decisions are
considered in this context.
4.1 Comparative statics
The analysis has been simpli¯ed by specifying the depollution function. The results would be of
the same vein with more general depollution functions. We assume that w(aj) = aj ¡ 1
2a2
j. This
16function respects the assumptions needed in order to ensure that a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
exists in the environmental market. Using this function, Appendix 6.2 gives the details leading
to the following comparative statics, deduced from the last two stages of the game (competition





















; 8 j = s;n (38)
No matter which country modi¯es its tax rate, the production of the high cost ¯rm varies in
the same direction whereas the variation in the production of the low cost ¯rm depends on
the di®erence in production costs. The overall production of environmental goods is always
positively correlated with tax rates.

















3(tj + t¡j)2 (40)
An increase in the domestic tax reduces the consumption of foreign environmental goods, because
the price of environmental goods is increased, without changing foreign incentives. It plays an
important role in the choice of the optimal tax rate which did not appear when markets were
segmented.
4.2 Non-cooperative strategies
Both countries choose simultaneously their environmental policy. When the polluting sector is
imperfectly competitive, the common fear is that it would lead to a race-to-the-bottom so as to
protect domestic competitiveness. In this model, polluting ¯rms are perfectly competitive but
the environmental policy determines the demand for the imperfectly competitive eco-industry.
Tax competition can change the incentives previously described. National welfare depends on




P(u)du ¡ c(xs) ¡ p(A)as




P(u)du ¡ c(xn) ¡ p(A)an
+ p(A)al ¡ cl(al) ¡ º (²(xn) ¡ w(an)) (42)
17Each regulator considers in its welfare function the demand of its polluting ¯rms and the pro¯t
of its eco-industry ¯rm. Each regulator is going to choose its tax taking the emission tax of the
other country as given. However, it takes into account the impact of a change in the tax on the
















































































Using the ¯rms' pro¯t maximization conditions and rearranging the expressions gives:




































Proposition 4 (i) A single world market and non-cooperative behaviors induce a new negative
incentive to the choice of the environmental taxation. In the same time, it has an ambiguous
impact on the rent e®ect, leading to an uncertain overall impact of trade liberalization (ii) In
this world, North becomes net exporter and South net importer (iii) The di®erence in tax rates
between countries remains ambiguous
Proof: (i) The terms into brackets of the numerators of Equations 45 and 46 summarize the
strategic incentives. In addition to the impact on the supply side of the environmental sector,
regulators consider the impact of a change of their own tax on the overall demand. As the
price of environmental inputs is increased by the tax, the foreign demand is always decreased,
which has a negative incentive on the optimal second-best tax rate in the domestic country. On
the other hand, the rent e®ect is now based on the trade balance of the country, which can
18push toward a higher, or a lower pollution tax. The denominator refers to the same terms than




dts, which gives the Northern regulator a more
important strategic incentive to reduce its tax. If North is net importer, by de¯nition an¡al > 0
and as ¡ ah < 0, which implies t¤
n > t¤
s as al > ah. However, an ¡ al > 0 would mean another
negative incentive in the choice of the Northern tax and a positive one in the Southern case. It
would imply t¤
n < t¤
s, which is a contradiction. (iii) This directly comes from the fact that North
is net exporter and South net importer. ¤
A decomposition of the optimal tax rate. Rewriting the previous conditions as in Duval
& Hamilton (2002), it becomes possible to present the three incentives playing a role in the
choice of the environmental taxation.


































First, there is the marginal environmental damage caused by domestic polluting ¯rms.12
Then, the terms into brackets on the RHS of Equations 47 and 48 sum up a terms-of-trade
e®ect and an imperfect competition e®ect. The sign of the terms-of-trade e®ect is determined
by the trade balance of each country. There is a positive (resp. negative) incentive on the level
of taxation for the net exporter (resp. net importer), as it means more (resp. less) rents due to
the increase in demand for abatement activities. The imperfect competition e®ect, taking into
account the sub-optimal level of abatement supplied by local eco-industry ¯rms, will be positive
as long as a more stringent environmental policy increases both eco- industry ¯rms' production
patterns. For the net importer country (South), if the terms-of-trade e®ect is more important
than the imperfect competition one, the environmental tax could even fall short of marginal
damage. Note that this trade-o® is di®erent from the one presented in Section 3 as there was
no direct trade e®ects when markets were segmented.
4.3 A cooperative strategy
Assume now that regulators join their decisions and consider the overall welfare.13 It is generally
assumed that it would hamper the decision to lower the tax rate and therefore would prevent
12Note that we have always assumed that the marginal environmental damage of pollution was identical between
countries. If it was lower in South, which in a sense seems more plausible, then the optimal tax rate would be
negatively distorted.
13It also means that side payments are possible among countries








P(u)du ¡ c(xs) ¡ c(xn)
¡ cl(al) ¡ ch(ah) ¡ º
¡
²(xs) + ²(xn) ¡ w(as) ¡ w(an)
¢
(49)
Maximizing this function with regard to tn and ts yields:




























Given the comparative statics presented above,14 even though eco-industry ¯rms are asym-
metric, a cooperative decision leads to an identical cooperative tax in both countries. As in the
case where eco-industries come from the same country, it is the overall production that matters
and not the ¯rms' market shares.
Proposition 5 (i) Cooperative taxation leads to similar taxes in both countries. (ii) When
production patterns increase in the tax, the cooperative environmental policy always leads to
higher pollution tax rates in South compared to the non-cooperative decision. The impact in
North is ambiguous.
Proof: See Appendix 6.3.
It is generally assumed that non-cooperative taxation leads to lower levels of taxation than
the optimal cooperative decision. Tax competition is considered as sub-optimal in the sense
that it does not protect enough the environment. In our approach, this argument can be used
when one talks about the Southern case. However, as far as North is concerned, the rent-shifting
e®ect emphasized in the previous section can lead to too much protection of the environment.
In this case, it would be in the interest of a global regulator to reduce the stringency of the
environmental policy. It would help maintaining a correct level of consumers' surplus. So, one
can see that sub-optimal levels of environmental taxation do not always lead to a reduction in
the environmental performance. The environment can also be over-protected.
14Tax variations give similar impacts on supply and demand, whatever the country considered
205 Conclusion
This work considers environmental taxation when cleaning up activities are supplied by inter-
national eco-industries. The ¯rst concern was whether foreign-owned eco-industries could act
as a brake on the stringency of environmental policies in the less developed countries. From
that point of view, the answer would rather be yes. It is particularly relevant when a Norther
eco-industry monopoly supplies Southern polluting ¯rms in abatement goods and services. As
90% of eco-industries come from OECD countries, one should be concerned about the conse-
quences of this asymmetry on environmental policies in developing countries. Moreover, the
WTO objective of a trade liberalization in environmental goods and services, directed to a bet-
ter consideration of environmental issues in developing countries, should be carefully considered
as it could lead to even lower environmental taxation in the poorest countries.
According to this work, what seems more important is to introduce competition in the envi-
ronmental industry. Compared to the traditional strategic environmental trade analysis, regu-
lators behave strategically so as to shift rents not in the ¯nal good market but at an upstream
level. It leads to rather surprising results. Even though Southern ¯rms are less e±cient, as
their market shares are increasing when pollution taxes are higher, it gives a strategic incentive
to the Southern regulator to push up its tax. However, it does not necessarily mean that the
overall welfare will be increased, notably because it leads to less e±ciency among eco-industry
¯rms. The argument that international cooperation could improve the environmental perfor-
mance remains partly relevant. It is generally true in the Southern case, but not necessarily
in North. Rents in the environmental sector can push Northern countries to over-tax polluting
¯rms compared to what should be socially optimal.
This work presents important caveats. We do not endogenize the market structure in the
environmental market. A free entry assumption would lead to more ¯rms and maybe less pro¯ts.
In the long run, the less e±cient ¯rms will also disappear or will have to become more e®ective.
Furthermore, there are other raising issues when dealing with eco-industries. As eco-industries
can also be seen as a source of employment, an important extension seems to reconsider the
traditional trade-o® between unemployment and environmental performance. Finally, if the
regulator can manipulate the tax to shift rents, the opposite argument should also be relevant:
there is no reason not to assume that the eco-industry will not try to in°uence the environmental
policy.
216 Appendix
6.1 Price and consumption of environmental goods and services
Let us consider country s (South) and present the second stage of the game (the environmental
market equilibrium). We take the tax rate as given (¯rst stage), so the analysis is symmetric for
country n. We specify the depollution function : w(as) = as ¡ 1
2a2
s. The overall inverse demand
is then: ps(as) = ts(1 ¡ as). Environmental ¯rms anticipate the demand in order to maximize
their pro¯ts, competing in a Cournot-Nash strategic game.
¦up
ahs = ts(1 ¡ (ahs + als))ahs ¡ chahs (52)
¦up
als = ts(1 ¡ (ahs + als))als ¡ clals (53)
First order conditions of pro¯t maximization give the reaction functions of both ¯rms. From
the reaction functions, an optimal level of production for each ¯rm is determined. Basic algebra
yields:
als =
ts ¡ 2cl + ch
3ts
; ahs =
ts ¡ 2ch + cl
3ts
; as = ahs + als =
2ts ¡ cl ¡ ch
3ts
(54)






















The equilibrium price of environmental inputs can now be deduced from the optimal level
of production: ps =
cl+ch+ts










We describe the last two stages of the game. It allows us to consider comparative statics. In each
country, it is assumed that polluting ¯rms are similar, choosing their environmental demand as
follows:
p = tj(1 ¡ aj); 8 j = s;n (56)
where p is the world price of environmental goods. The overall demand is the sum of national
demands. The functions are invertible:











(2 ¡ A) (58)
Everything else being identical, the price of environmental goods and services increases when
the tax rate is increased in one of the countries (p0
tj > 0). Eco-industry ¯rms, based in each










(2 ¡ (ah + al))al ¡ clal (60)
First order conditions of pro¯t maximization give the reaction functions of both ¯rms. From
the reaction functions, an optimal level of production for each ¯rm is determined. Basic algebra
yields:
al =




2tnts ¡ 2ch(tn + ts) + cl(tn + ts)
3tnts
(62)
A = ah + al =
(4tn ¡ cl ¡ ch)ts ¡ (cl + ch)tn
3tnts
(63)
The equilibrium price of environmental inputs can now be deduced from the optimal level of
production:
p =
(cl + ch)tn + (cl + ch + 2tn)ts
3(tn + ts)
(64)
From this price, we deduce the optimal demand in environmental goods and services of polluting







;8 j;¡j 2 [s;n] (65)
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3.5
First, let us notice that the denominator of Equation 51 is necessarily higher than the denomi-
nator of Equation 46, but still negative. When we look at the numerators of Equations 51 and




dts. The ¯rst term is necessarily positive
and the second one negative. Therefore, we are sure that the non-cooperative tax in South is
lower than the cooperative one.





dtn , which are both negative. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude on
whether the cooperative tax is necessarily higher than the non-cooperative one.
When both countries are similar, i.e. eco-industry ¯rms are identical, no international trade
arises and the cooperative tax is necessarily higher than the non-cooperative one.
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